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Dogfight:
Criticizing the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Amidst the Largest Dispute
in World Trade Organization Historyt
ABSTRACT
The United States and the European Union have pointed
fingers at each other in the largest dispute in World Trade
Organization history. At issue are alleged violations of anti-
subsidy provisions regarding aviation titans Boeing and Airbus.
The seeds of the feud were planted more than thirty-five years ago
when Europe created Airbus to compete with the United States'
dominant hold over ninety-four percent of the commercial aircraft
market. The current litigation may impact a wide range of
individuals: from the nine billion passengers who bought a plane
ticket last year, to manufacturing workers in Hamburg, Germany
and Everett, Washington. Amidst the multibillion dollar feud, the
question must be asked: is the World Trade Organization's
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures pragmatic?
Additionally, can the World Trade Organization's Dispute
Settlement Understanding effectively deal with subsidies to large
civil aircraft manufacturers? This comment will argue that
banning subsidies to the large civil aircraft industry is not
practical. Further, the World Trade Organization will not be able
to effectively curtail subsidies in the large civil aircraft industry.
These arguments are presented along with a brief background, a
presentation of the relevant documents, and a forecast of the
aviation feud's future.
The author would like to thank his parents, Irving and Marian Lee, for all their
support.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
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I. Introduction
The feud between aircraft manufacturing giants Airbus and
Boeing has soared to the World Trade Organization (WTO)-
again. The fight between the world's dominant aviation
companies involves countries on both sides of the Atlantic and a
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possible four billion dollar slap on the wrist.'
In October of 2004, the United States and the European Union
(EU) initiated the first phase in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU) by requesting consultations.2 Both the
United States and the European Communities (EC)3 alleged that
the other had violated the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) by subsidizing Airbus
and Boeing, respectively.4 These consultations did not resolve the
dispute.5 Subsequently, on May 31, 2005, the United States
initiated the next phase of the DSU by requesting that a panel be
formed to investigate its claims.6  In response, the European
Communities renewed its allegations and requested a panel as
well.'
On September 23, 2005, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) initiated the information-gathering process.8 Meanwhile,
I Heather Long, Trade War Fear as WTO Investigates Airbus and Boeing
Subsidies, GUARDIAN (London), July 21, 2005, at 20. Monetary compensation is not part
of the DSU; rather, remedies are either a withdrawal of the subsidy, compensation based
on mutually agreed trade concessions, or countervailing measures. See discussion on
Non-compliance infra Part IV.E.
2 Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities and
Certain Member States-Measures Affecting trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/I
(Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Consultation Request EC-Aircraft]; Request for
Consultations by the European Communities, United States-Measures Affecting Trade
in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/1 (Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Consultation Request
U.S.-Aircraft].
3 For legal reasons, the European Union is referred to as the European
Communities in WTO matters. WTO-European Communities, Member Information,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/countriese/european-communitiese.htm. This
comment, however, will use the European Union (EU) and European Communities (EC)
interchangeably.
4 Consultation Request EC-Aircraft, supra note 2; Consultation Request U.S.-
Aircraft, supra note 2.
5 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, European
Communities and Certain Member States-Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft, WT/DS316/2 (June 3, 2005) [hereinafter Panel Request EC-Aircraft].
6 Id.
7 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United
States-Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/2 (June 3, 2005)
[hereinafter Panel Request U.S.-Aircraft].
8 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures annex V(4), Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex LA,
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Britain continued its plan to provide Airbus with £400 million in
repayable loans.9  This so-called "launch aid" was for the
development of a new passenger jet, the A350.'0 Newspapers
hyped these events as a catalyst for possibly the "world's biggest
trade war."'"
In February, 2006 the DSB established a panel to hear the
dispute. 12 The complexity of the case, however, caused the panel
to inform the DSB that it would exceed the WTO's six month time
frame. 13 The panel, which is the first level of adjudication, is
expected to complete its work in 2007.14
As the United States and European Communities point fingers
at each other alleging government subsidy violations, the question
must be asked: is the WTO's SCM Agreement pragmatic? This
comment will argue that applying the SCM Agreement to special
industries, such as large civil aircraft manufacturing, is not
practical. The enormous costs in the aircraft manufacturing
industry make subsidies necessary. Subsidizing the industry
encourages innovation and allows for competition. Thus, the
SCM Agreement should not be applied to the civil aircraft
industry. Further, the dogfight between the European
Communities and United States cannot be resolved successfully
using the current WTO resolution process to enforce the SCM
Agreement. This is because WTO decisions are enforced by the
authorization of trade sanctions by the injured country. Since both
countries appear to be guilty of violations and because a trade war
is undesirable, enforcement is unlikely.
This comment will unfold in five principle parts. In section II,
a brief background of the Airbus-Boeing feud will be presented.
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs.e/legal-e/24-scm.pdf [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
9 Tracey Boles, Trade War Looms as UK Grants Aid to Airbus, Bus., Sept. 18,
2005, at Focus 6.
10 Id.
I IId.
12 Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, European Communities and
Certain Member States-Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/7
(Apr. 13, 2006).
13 Id.
14 Id.
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Parts III and IV will summarize the relevant legal documents-the
SCM Agreement and the DSU. Next, Part V will critique the
SCM Agreement and the DSU. Lastly, Part VI will forecast the
future scenarios for the aviation feud.
The heart of this paper will cover three areas: an argument
against applying the SCM Agreement to large civil aircraft, how
the DSU enforcement problem is aggravated when dealing with
commercial aviation subsidies, and the future of the dispute. But
first, we will visit the beginning.
II. Background on the Aviation Feud
A. The Arrival of Airbus
The seeds for the Airbus-Boeing feud were sown a quarter
century before the WTO was even formed.15 In the late 1960s,
government-supported British, West German, and French aviation
firms began plans to form what was later to become Airbus. 16
Britain left the group in 1969 and did not return until 1979."7
Thus, Europe's aviation future began as a consortium of France's
Aerospatiale and Germany's Deutsche Airbus. 8 Airbus Industrie
was officially formed in 1970 and joined by Spain's CASA in
1974.'9 Presently, Airbus is operated through national companies
that are each responsible for making specific components. 20 Final
plane assembly takes place in Toulouse, France and Hamburg,
Germany. 2
1
15 The WTO was formed in 1995. WORLD TRADE ORG., THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 3 (2005), http://www.wto.org/englishres-e/doloade/inbr-e.pdf
(providing and overview of WTO history and structure).
16 STEPHEN ARIS, CLOSE TO THE SUN: How AIRBUS CHALLENGED AMERICA'S
DOMINATION OF THE SKIES 223 (2002).
17 Hans-Joachim Braun, Innovation in Flight from the Perspective of Europe, in
RECONSIDERING A CENTURY OF FLIGHT 70, 80 (Roger D. Launius & Janet R. Daly
Bednarek eds., 2003).
18 Airbus Corporate Information/People & Organisation/Company Evolution,
http://www.airbus.com/en/corporate/people/Airbus-short-history.html (last visited Oct.
17, 2006) [hereinafter Airbus Company Evolution].
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Airbus Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.airbus.com/en/utilities/
faqs.html (click on "Q. Where are Airbus aircraft manufactured?") (last visited Oct. 19,
2006]
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One of Airbus' initial goals was admittedly to "challenge
American supremacy in the aviation industry. 2 2  At Airbus'
inception, American aviation firms accounted for ninety-four
percent of the commercial airline market.2 3  By the late 1990s,
however, Airbus had outlasted two of its original heavyweight
opponents, McDonell Douglas24 and Lockheed.2 1 In 1998, Airbus
captured over fifty percent of the global market, beating the
world's remaining major manufacturer-Boeing.26
B. U.S. Aviation and Boeing
Boeing Airplane Company is the legacy of William Boeing,
who dropped out of Yale to start a successful lumber business.27
After attending the first American Air Meet in 1910, his aviation
interest blossomed and six years later he founded Pacific Aero
Products. 28 A year later in 1917, he changed the company's name
to reflect his surname.29
Much of Boeing's history parallels the story of U.S. aviation.
The inauguration of human flight took place in 1903 by
Americans-the Wright brothers-at Kitty Hawk, North
Carolina. 30 By World War I, though, the United States was greatly
outclassed by European aviation technology.3' European
governments invested heavily in research and design; this resulted
2006).
22 Airbus Corporate Evolution, supra note 18.
23 Braun, supra note 17, at 78-79.
24 ARIs, supra note 16, at 225. Boeing bought out McDonnell Douglas in 1996. Id.
25 Robert J. Carbaugh & John Olienyk, Boeing-Airbus Subsidy Dispute: A Sequel,
GLOBAL ECON. J., Dec. 2004, at 2, http://www.bepress.com/gej/vol4/iss2/6/. Lockheed
exited the commercial airliner market in the early 1980's. Id.
26 ARIs, supra note 16, at 217. In 2000, Boeing reclaimed an advantage in the
market. Id.
27 Boeing History-Biographies-Boeing: William E. Boeing, http://www.boeing
.com/history/boeing/boeing.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2006).
28 Boeing History-The Beginnings: Building a Company, http://www.boeing
.com/history/boeing/building.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).
29 Id.
30 Boeing History, supra note 27.
31 Roger D. Launius, The Wright Brothers, Government Support for Aeronautical
Research, and the Evolution of Flight, in RECONSIDERING A CENTURY OF FLIGHT 50, 55-
56 (Roger D. Launius & Janet R. Daly Bednarek eds., 2003).
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in the emergence of the airplane as a battlefield weapon during
World War 1.32 U.S. aviation manufacturers did not receive major
government funding for research and development until World
War II, at which time the U.S. aviation industry enjoyed a brief
flutter of success.33 But with the end of World War II came the
start of demobilization and a decrease in the level of U.S.
government funding for aviation.34 As a result, the post-World
War II years saw the U.S. aviation industry struggle, but the
struggle was short-lived. With the onset of the Cold War,
military funding for aerospace research took off and the U.S.
industry maintained a steady pulse for the latter half of the
twentieth century.36
C. International Trade and Civil Aviation Agreements
Post-World War II international economic relations began at a
conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. 37  Here, the
organizations that later became the World Bank were born.38
Also, the International Monetary Fund was created to facilitate the
financial side of European reconstruction.39  Lastly, the
International Trade Organization (ITO) was proposed at the
conference as a means to regulate trade and reduce tariffs.4" The
ITO never materialized; however, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created.4 Originally, GATT was
not envisioned as an institution; it was designed as a tool to aid the
ITO. In the absence of the ITO, GATT became the main body for
international trade until the creation of the WTO.42
GATT was brought into force by twenty-three signatory
32 Id. at 55.
33 Id. at 60.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 61.
36 Id. at 61-62.
37 David A. Gantz, Introduction to the World Trading System and Trade Law
protecting U.S. Business, 18 WHIT7IER L. REv. 289, 293 (1997).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 293-94.
20061
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countries in 1947. 43 It was an attempt to create a framework that
would limit tariffs.' The agreement's purpose was to continue
liberalizing trade through regular negotiation "rounds.,
45
Originally, GATT did little to dissuade government
subsidization. Countries that subsidized products were merely
obligated to notify the contracting parties of the extent and
ramifications of the subsidization.46 If the subsidy prejudiced
another country, a discussion about limiting the subsidy would be
honored upon request.47
In 1955, GATT expanded its agreement on subsidies.48  The
additions drew distinctions between types of government aid and
subsidies.49 It also added teeth to enforce the subsidy provision.5°
Countries were authorized to use countervailing measures against
parties that violated the subsidy agreement.5' Accordingly, tariffs
proportional to the subsidized good could be authorized.52
GATT was effective in reducing direct tariffs and its
negotiation system produced eight rounds. 53  The seventh round
took place in Tokyo from 1973 to 1979.5' Ninety-nine countries
participated in the Tokyo Round, which included, among other
things, a plurilateral Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft.55 The
43 HAMMOND SUDDARDS SOLICITORS, AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 1-2 (Konstantinos Adamantopoulos ed., 1997) [hereinafter AN ANATOMY
OF THE WTO].
44 Daniel I. Fisher, Note, "Super Jumbo" Problem: Boeing, Airbus, and the Battle
for the Geopolitical Future, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865, 871 (2002).
45 AN ANATOMY OF THE WTO, supra note 43, at 2.
46 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55
U.N.T.S. 187 [herein after GAT].
47 Id.
48 Shane Spradlin, Comment, The Aircraft Subsidies Dispute in the GAT's
Uruguay Round, 60 SMU J. AIR L. CoM. 1191, 1194 (1995).
49 Id. at 1194-95.
50 See id. at 1195.
51 See id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Spradlin, supra note 48, at 1195.
55 Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.) at 162, Annex 4A (1979) [hereinafter Civil Aircraft Agreement].
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agreement featured the elimination of all import duties on civil
aircraft and components, regulations on government financial
support for the industry, and the creation of a Committee on Civil
Aircraft. 6 One criticism was that the term "subsidy" was not
specifically defined, but only illustrated by a list of examples. 7
The eighth GATT round was the birthplace of the WTO. The
Uruguay Round began in Punta del Este, Uruguay, but took place
mostly at the GATT office in Geneva.58 One hundred twenty-five
countries participated in the round and it produced the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.5 9 The
agreement also annexed significant portions of previous GATT
documents.6 ° In all, the Uruguay Round produced eighteen
agreements spanning six hundred pages.6' Relevant to this
comment was the unmodified annexation of the Tokyo Round's
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft which has twenty-one
signatories. 62 Another prominent element of the Airbus-Boeing
feud-and a major focus of this paper-was the adoption of the
SCM Agreement which expanded upon previous negotiations
from the Tokyo Round.63
Even with the backdrop of GATT's success with tariffs,
tensions in the air between Europe and the United States were
simmering. 6 In 1984, the United States began negotiations with
the hope of extinguishing the types of funding given to Airbus by
56 AN ANATOMY OF THE WTO, supra note 43, at 26. See Civil Aircraft Agreement,
supra note 55, at 162.
57 Julie Dunne, Note and Comment, Delverde and the WTO's British Steel
Decision Foreshadow More Conflict Where the WTO Subsidies Agreement,
Privatization, and United States Countervailing Duty Law Intersect, 17 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 79, 99-100 (2001).
58 Gantz, supra note 37, at 295.
59 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
60 See General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Legal-Instruments
Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
61 AN ANATOMY OF THE WTO, supra note 43, at 6-7.
62 Id. at 26.
63 Id. at 18.
64 See Michael J. Levick, Note, The Production of Civil Aircraft: A Compromise of
Two World Giants, 21 U. DENY. TRANSP. L.J. 434, 441 (1993).
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ratcheting up GATT's Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft.65 As
a fall back measure, the United States also pursued informal
negotiations outside of GATT; in 1987 the United States and
European Union began talks about Airbus' funding.66 Although
the bilateral negotiations showed some potential, they stalled
because the parties could not reach an agreement about the
percentage of development costs a government could subsidize.67
The stalemate was broken when the United States discovered an
explicit German export subsidy to Deutsche Airbus and filed a
complaint with the GATT Subsidies Committee. 68 "[T]he Airbus
partner was provided exchange rate guarantees by its government,
under the auspices of a privatization program, worth an estimated
$2.5 million on each Airbus aircraft delivered in 1990. " 69 A
GATT panel ruled that the German exchange rate guarantee
violated the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft.70
In the wake of the German exchange rate case, the United
States capitalized on its bargaining windfall and finally worked
out a bilateral agreement with the European Union.71  The
Agreement Concerning Application of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade to Trade in Civil Aircraft (1992 U.S.-E.C.
Aircraft Agreement) was signed on July 17, 1992.72 The
agreement accomplished five notable objectives: (1) future aircraft
production subsidies were banned, (2) development subsides were
capped at thirty-three percent of total cost,73 (3) the prohibition of
government aviation marketing assistance that grew out of the
Tokyo Round was reiterated, 4 (4) greater disclosure of state
support was mandated, 75 and (5) indirect government support was
65 See Spradlin, supra note 48, at 1206.
66 Id. at 1207.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See Levick, supra note 64, at 441.
71 Id.
72 Agreement Concerning the Application of the GATT Agreement on Trade in
Civil Aircraft on Trade in Larger Civil Aircraft, July 17, 1992, U.S.-E.C., 31 U.S.T. 619.
73 Levick, supra note 64, at 452.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 456.
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limited to three percent of the annual industry sales, and four
percent of each company's annual sales.76
Despite negotiations and attempts to resolve the subsidy issue,
the aviation feud continued. In the fall of 2004, the United States
and the European Union attempted to modify the 1992 U.S.-E.C.
Aircraft Agreement.77 Unfortunately, a new understanding could
not be reached and the United States withdrew from negotiations.78
Subsequently, the United States turned to the WTO and initiated
action pursuant to the SCM Agreement in accordance with the
DSU 79
III. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM Agreement)
A. Purpose of the SCM Agreement
In the absence of a preamble, the WTO Appellate Body8 has
relied upon the SCM Agreement's text to ascertain its purpose.8'
The agreement "contains a set of rights and obligations that go
well beyond merely applying and interpreting ... GATT 1947. "82
Further, "[t]aken as a whole, the main object and purpose of the
SCM Agreement is to increase and improve GATT disciplines
relating to the use of both subsidies and countervailing
measures."83
76 Id. at 457.
77 Carbaugh & Olienyk, supra note 25, at 3.
78 Id.
79 Panel Request EC-Aircraft, supra note 5.
80 The WTO does not have a per se rule mandating stare decisis; however, WTO
members rely on past Appellate Body Reports for support and direction. This is
understandable considering that the DSU proclaims that the dispute settlement system
provides security and predictability. Consequently, this comment has looked to the
Appellate Body Reports to help explain WTO agreements. See Valerie Hughes, WTO
Dispute Settlement: An Overview, in CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO 23, 35
(Andrew D. Mitchell ed., 2005).
81 Appellate Body Report, United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, 73, WT/DS213/AB/R
(Nov. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report US-Carbon Steel].
82 Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, 19,
WT/DS22/AB/R (Feb. 27, 1997).
83 Appellate Body Report US-Carbon Steel, supra note 81.
20061
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B. Definition of a Subsidy
The SCM Agreement defines "subsidy" in greater depth than
previous GATT agreements had ventured. Under the agreement, a
subsidy exists if "there is a financial contribution by a government
or any public body within the territory of a Member...,84 Five
instances are provided to define what is meant by "a financial
contribution."
First, a subsidy exists when "a government practice involves a
direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, and equity infusion),
potential direct transfers of funds[,] or liabilities (e.g., loan
guarantees)[J.]" 85 Second, a subsidy also exists when a government
forgoes taxes that would otherwise be due.86  Uncollected
government revenue that had already accrued before the
agreement was exempt from the subsidy prohibition.87
Revenue which is "otherwise due" is ambiguous enough to
warrant interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body. Theoretically,
a government could tax all revenue; therefore, if one took this
extreme approach then all governments who did not tax 100% of
revenues would fit the subsidy definition. Of course, that would
be over-inclusive. "There must, therefore, be some defined
normative benchmark against which a comparison can be made
between the revenue actually raised and the revenue that would
have been raised 'otherwise."' 8
The dispute panel89 must determine what a government should
be taxing and whether that is consistent with what is actually being
taxed. This is not an easy task; each country has a complex tax
system and there is no general domestic tax standard that a panel
can rely upon. 90  The WTO Appellate Body has provided
guidance: "panels should seek to compare the fiscal treatment of
84 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, 1.1(a)(1).
85 Id. [1.1(a)(l)(i).
86 Id. 1.1(a)(1)(ii).
87 Id. n.1.
88 Appellate Body Report, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations," 90, WIT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report U.S.-FSC].
89 An explanation of the dispute resolution panel will be discussed infra Part IV.B.
90 See Appellate Body Report U.S.-FSC, supra note 88, 1 91.
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legitimately comparable income to determine whether the
contested measure involves the foregoing to revenue which is
'otherwise due', [sic] in relation to the income in question."'"
A third instance of subsidization is when a government
provides goods or services that are not for the state's general
infrastructure.9 2 A "good" in the SCM Agreement is broad; it
includes "tangible items of property, such as trees, that are
severable from land." 93 As the Appellate Body observed, a narrow
interpretation of a "good" would undermine the agreement.94 For
example, if a country provided standing trees-a forest-to a
lumber enterprise, then a good has been provided; to hold
otherwise would open up a detrimental loophole in the
agreement.95
While the SCM Agreement allows a government to provide
support for the "general infrastructure," that does not mean that
government assistance for any infrastructure aid will be tolerated.96
The exception only applies to "infrastructure of a general
nature.97 For example, a government could provide funding for a
national oil pipeline, but not a pipeline between an oil refinery and
the front door of a manufacturing plant that runs on oil.
Fourth, a subsidy also exists if a government funds a private
group that carries out any of the first three instances of subsidies.98
This stops governments from circumventing the agreement by
using a private entity as a clever mask.
The fifth instance is really a rehash of previous GATT subsidy
provisions. A subsidy exists if "there is any form of income or
price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994 and a
benefit is thereby conferred." 99 Article XVI addresses subsidies
91 Id.
92 SCM Agreement, supra note 8,11.1(a)()(iii).
93 Appellate Body Report, United States-Final Countervailing Duty
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, T 59,
WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter U.S.-Softwood Lumber IV].
94 See id. 64.
95 See id.
96 See id. 60.
97 Id. (emphasis in original).
98 Id. 1.1(a)(1)(iv).
99 Id. l.l(a)(2).
2006]
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on exports of primary products.'t °  A subsidy exists if a
government helps to reduce the price of a primary product so that
the country can gain more than an equitable share of the world
market in that export. 10'
If one of the five instances of a financial contribution is met, a
benefit must also be conferred to a specific enterprise or
enterprises for a subsidy to exist. To be considered a conferral of
benefit, the recipient must be in a better position after the financial
contribution was made than had the contribution not been made at
all. 0 2 The market provides a useful tool in determining whether a
"benefit" exists. 0 3  "The question whether a 'financial
contribution' confers a 'benefit' depends.., on whether the
recipient has received a 'financial contribution' on terms more
favourable than those available to the recipient in the market."' 4
An enterprise can do business with a government as long as the
fair market value is used.10
5
The SCM Agreement splits subsidies into three categories:
prohibited, actionable, and non-actionable. These three types of
subsidies are still under the umbrella of the general definition of
subsidy;'0 6 although each type of subsidy is treated differently by
the agreement. The WTO Secretariat analogizes the classification
scheme to a traffic light: red is prohibited, yellow is actionable,
and green is non-actionable.' 7
10o General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XVI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194.
101 See WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS 90-91
(1990).
102 See Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, 157 (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Canada-Aircraft].
103 Id.
104 Appellate Body Report, United States-Imposition of Countervailing Duties on
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United
Kingdom, 68, WT/DS 1 38/AB/R (May 20, 2000) [hereinafter U.S.-Lead and Bismuth
III.
105 See id.
106 Appellate Body Report U.S.-FSC, supra note 88, 89 (ruling that the general
definition of subsidy applies throughout the SCM Agreement).
107 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 101, at 92-97.
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C. Prohibited Subsidies
Red light, stop, proceed no further. Prohibited subsidies are
those that are more visibly designed to affect trade. 118  These
subsidies are "prohibited" because they are more likely to have
negative effects on other WTO members.'0 9 Prohibited subsidies
fall into two categories: export subsidies and import substitution
subsidies." '0
Export subsidies are contingent upon export performance."'
Annex I of the SCM Agreement provides a detailed list of export
subsidies. These include: (a) direct subsidies to an enterprise
based on export performance, (b) currency retention schemes, (c)
government mandated internal transportation charges on export
shipments that are more favorable to domestic shipments, (d)
subsidies on items used for production of exports, (e) tax breaks
for export enterprises, (f)-(g) tax deductions directly and indirectly
related to exports above those given to products consumed
domestically, and (h) indirect taxes on goods or services used in
the production of export products. 12 Import substitution subsidies
are those that are contingent "upon the use of domestic over
imported goods."" 3
The SCM Agreement treats prohibited subsidy allegations with
a sense of urgency. If a WTO member suspects prohibited
subsidies are being provided they can request consultations."
14
"[T]he Member believed to be granting or maintaining the subsidy
in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly as
possible. The purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the
facts of the situation and to arrive at a mutually agreed
solution.""' 
108 Id. at 93.
109 See id.
110 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, 3.1. An exception is provided in the Agreement
on Agriculture. Id.
I' Id. [3.1 (a).
112 See SCM Agreement, supra note 8, Annex I. Annex I, the list of export
subsidies, is over eleven-hundred words long; this summary does not capture all the
intricacies of the list. Id.
'13 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, 1 3.1(b).
114 Id. 4.1.
115 Id. 14.3.
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Rules for prohibited subsidy allegations are different than
those generally applied by the WTO." 6 For example, the thirty
day consultation period is half as long as those concerning
actionable subsidies.'17 In general, the deadlines for action on a
prohibited subsidy complaint are half as long as regular
procedures." 8 Also, prohibited subsidy matters can be expedited
by the establishment of a five person panel that has expertise in the
area in question."9 The expert panel is convened at the behest of
the dispute resolution panel;120  however, the experts'
determination of whether a prohibited subsidy exists must be
accepted without modification.121
If prohibited subsidization is found then the dispute resolution
panel immediately recommends that the subsidizing member
withdraw the subsidy. 22 In contrast, actionable subsidies are not
given the same sense of urgency; i.e., a finding of actionable
subsidies does not mandate an immediate recommendation.'23 The
appeals process for prohibited subsidies follows the regular DSU
system, with the modification of half time-periods. 1
24
D. Actionable Subsidies
Actionable subsidies have the cautionary glow of a yellow
light; they are not a clear red or green light. As the WTO
Secretariat explains, these "are neither prohibited nor exempt from
challenge, and which are therefore potentially open to complaint,
or to countervailing action, provided the necessary conditions are
met.' ' 125 Whereas prohibited subsidies are absolutely disallowed,
actionable subsidies require some analysis to determine if they
116 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 101, at 94.
117 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, T 4.4.
118 Id. T 4.12; see also WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 101, at 94.
119 See SCM Agreement, supra note 8, 4.5.
120 The dispute resolution panel is explained infra Part IV.
121 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, 4.5.
122 Id. 4.7.
123 See id. art. 7.
124 Id. 4.12.
125 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 101, at 94.
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violate the agreement. An actionable subsidy 126 is one that meets
both the general definition of a subsidy 127 and has an adverse
effect on other members. 1
28
The possible adverse effects are broken into three categories:
"[1] injury to the domestic industry of another Member; [2]
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or
indirectly to other Members ... ; [3] serious prejudice to the
interest of another Member."
29
The injury caused to a government's domestic industry closely
parallels the impact caused by dumping. 3 ° Tools for determining
an injury to a domestic industry are provided by the SCM
Agreement. 3' Two factors are examined in tandem, "both [1] the
volume of the subsidized imports and the effects of the subsidized
imports on prices in the domestic market for like products and [2]
the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic producers
of such products."'
132
Nullification or impairment occurs when market access by one
member is undercut by the effects of another member's subsidized
goods that alter the market.
133
The adverse effect of serious prejudice receives great attention
126 See SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 5. There is an agricultural exception per
the Agreement on Agriculture. Id.
127 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 1-2. The general definition of a subsidy is
discussed supra Part III.B.
128 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 5.
129 Id.
130 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 101, at 80-81. Dumping occurs when a product
is "introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the
export price of the product exported from one country to another is less than the
comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for
consumption in the exporting country." Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 14, 1994, Multilateral
Agreements on Trade and Goods, Annex IA, Legal Instruments-Results of the
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of GATT].
131 "The term 'injury to the domestic industry' is used here in the same sense it is
used in Part V [within Article 15 of the SCM Agreement]." Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of GATT, supra note 130, n. 11; see SCM Agreement,
supra note 8, art. 15.
132 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, 15.1.
133 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 101, at 95.
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in the SCM Agreement. "[A]n analysis of serious prejudice
focuses on situations where a member's export interests are
affected by subsidization." '134 The subsidies are divided into two
groups.
In the first group, adverse effects are presumed to exist if a
subsidy is either: (a) more than 5% of the value of the product, (b)
covering operating losses of an industry, (c) covering operating
losses by an enterprise, except if it is a one-time part of a long-
term solution and it prevents acute social problems, or (d) for the
direct forgiveness of debt.135 With these four instances the burden
is on the member who is being accused. 3 6  Previous GATT
subsidy agreements did not have these rebuttable presumptions;
so, the heavy burden of proving causation has shifted in these four
instances. 3 7  For any other allegation of serious prejudice,
however, the burden is still on the claimant.
In the second group, serious prejudice may arise when:
exports from another member into the market of the subsidizing
member, or into the market of a third country, are displaced or
impeded; [or] significant price undercutting, price suppression
or price depression are caused, as compared with sales of a like
product of another member in the same market; [or] the
subsidized product causes significant loss of sales in the same
market; or the subsidy leads to an increase in the subsidizing
country's share in the world market for primary product.' 38
If actionable subsidies are found to have adverse effects, remedies
have a speedier timetable for dispute resolution than under the
normal resolution process. 39  In terms of urgency, actionable
subsidies are somewhere below prohibited subsidies, but above
most other matters that go to dispute resolution."4° The resolution
process for actionable subsidies will be discussed later in the DSU
discussion.
134 Id.
135 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, T 6.1.
136 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 101, at 96.
137 See id.
138 Id. at 95.
139 Id. at 96.
140 Id.
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E. Non-actionable Subsidies
With non-actionable subsidies governments have a green light
and the most leeway to proceed. Non-actionable subsidies are not
a main focus of the aircraft feud; therefore, discussion of these
subsidies will be limited. A summary of non-actionable subsidies
is: limited assistance for basic research, assistance to
disadvantaged regions, and assistance in bringing existing
facilities up to speed with environmental regulations. 141 Pertinent
to the aircraft feud is footnote twenty four of the SCM Agreement,
which excludes research on civil aircraft from being considered a
non-actionable subsidy. 1
42
The SCM Agreement does not provide complete shelter for
non-actionable subsidies. A member may request consultations if
they believe harmful effects are resulting from the non-actionable
subsidies. 43 Eventually, the committee overseeing the agreement
may become involved and make recommendations. A failure to
follow recommendations could result in authorization for
countermeasures to be taken by the complaining member.'"
F. The Allegations
In their request for a panel, neither the United States nor the
European Union included any claims of harmful non-actionable
subsidies in their allegations. 45 Both sides of the aircraft feud,
however, have alleged prohibited subsidization and actionable
subsidization. 14
6
In its complaint requesting a panel the United States alleged
multiple instances of subsidization by the consortium. 14' These
included financial contributions for infrastructure and facilities for
Airbus companies, forgiveness of debt from launch aid, equity
141 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, 8.2(a)-(c). A list of the limitations and other
restrictions are provided in the agreement. Id.
142 Id. n.24.
143 Jd. T 9.1.
144 Id. 19.4.
145 Panel Request EC-Aircraft, supra note 5; Panel Request U.S.-Aircraft, supra
note 7.
146 Panel Request EC-Aircraft, supra note 5; Panel Request U.S.-Aircraft, supra
note 7.
147 See Panel Request EC-Aircraft, supra note 5.
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infusions and grants through government controlled banks, and
various research and development funding programs.'48
Specifically addressing prohibited subsidies, "Itlhe United States
is concerned that the launch aid provided by the European
Communities and the Member States to Airbus for the
development of large civil aircraft... appear[s] to be export
subsidies inconsistent with [the Prohibited Subsidies article] of the
SCM Agreement."' 49  The United States points to development
funding programs for the Airbus aircraft models A340-500/600
and the A380. 5° The United States also points to a loan to
Airbuses' major parent company from the European Investment
Bank.' 5'
In the European Union's complaint requesting a panel, the
European Communities claims that multiple U.S. measures qualify
as either prohibited or actionable subsidies. The European
Communities alleges state and local government subsidization
"through tax breaks, bond financing, lease arrangements, corporate
headquarters relocation assistance, research funding, infrastructure
measures, and other benefits.' ' 52  The European Communities
alleges such local government subsidization specifically in the
states of Washington and Illinois. 153  Further, the European
Communities asserts that NASA, the U.S. Department of Defense,
the NIST, and the U.S. Department of Labor have subsidized the
aircraft industry with funding and other benefits, including federal
income tax incentives.
154
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Panel Request U.S.-Aircraft, supra note 7.
153 Id. Boeing is headquartered in Chicago, IL and has large production facilities in
Washington state. Boeing, "Boeing in Brief: About Us," http://www.boeing.com/
companyoffices/aboutus/brief.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
154 See Panel Request U.S.-Aircraft, supra note 7.
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IV. Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
A. Overview
The WTO dispute system15 will possibly be dealing with the
aviation feud for years to come. Nevertheless, the DSU is
regarded as an improvement over its predecessor and (relative to
other international schemes) is considered a fast-paced
mechanism. The WTO Secretariat has explained: "[s]ettling
disputes in a timely and structured manner is important. It helps
prevent the detrimental effects of unresolved international trade
conflicts and mitigates the imbalances between stronger and
weaker players by having their disputes settled on the basis of
rules rather than having power determine the outcome."'56  In
general, the SCM Agreement accelerates the DSU system's time
frame.'57 In some instances the timetables are cut in half.15 8
The WTO dispute resolution system evolved from its GATT
predecessor.159  The GATT system was hampered by several
problems. For example, GATT members could delay or block the
process by preventing the establishment of a panel. 6 ' Also, if a
panel was formed, a member could hinder the selection of
panelists or the term of the panel. 16' Further, a decision by the
panel could be blocked by the member who was complained
against. 162  Even if the panel decision was adopted, GATT
155 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, Legal Texts-The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
1869 U.N.T.S. 400, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter DSU].
156 WTO SECRETARIAT, A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1
(2004).
157 Id. at 61. For example, the SCM Agreement calls for a swifter approach for
actionable and prohibited subsidies. Id.
158 For example, the Appellate Body in the DSU system should submit their report
to the DSB within thirty days under the SCM Agreement, but in regular cases a sixty day
window is opened. See DSU, supra note 155, art. 17.5; SCM Agreement, supra note 8,
1 4.9.
159 Peter Lichtenbaum, Procedural Issues in WTO Dispute Resolution, 19 MICH. J.
INT'LL. 1195, 1198 (1998).
160 Id. at 1199.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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members could not be certain that countervailing measures would
be authorized in the event of non-compliance. '63 The result of this
inefficiency was a sweeping overhaul of reforms during the
Uruguay Round. '64
Piloting the DSU is the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The
DSB is entrusted with "the authority to establish panels, adopt
panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of
implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize
suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered
agreements."'' 65  This single body responsible for dispute
resolution is another improvement over GATT. 166  Previously,
separate committees oversaw each different agreement resulting in
forum shopping.'67  The unified administration of the DSU
streamlines the process and eliminates forum shopping.
The DSB is composed of representatives of all WTO
members. 68  Their decisions are decided by a consensus; a
proposed matter passes if no member present makes an affirmative
objection. 169 For matters concerning plurilateral trade agreements,
such as the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, the only
members who participate are those who represent a party to the
plurilateral agreement. 70
B. Litigation
Currently, the WTO dispute resolution process starts with
bilateral talks. As with any type of litigation, ending it before it
starts is preferred. U.S. trade representative, Rob Portman and his
European counterpart, Peter Mandelson, have stated their
preference would be to negotiate rather than to litigate the aviation
163 See id.
164 See id. at 1200-01.
165 DSU, supra note 155, art. 2.1.
166 See David Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System, 24 FORDHtAM L. REV. 444, 469
(2000), reprinted in DAVID PALMETER, WTO AS A LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND POLICY 305, 328 (2003).
167 Id.
168 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 17.
169 DSU, supra note 155, n.1.
170 See id., art. 2.1.
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subsidy dispute.'
Similar to the GATT system, the DSU begins with a
consultation stage. 7 2 The hope is that consultations will yield a
solution and avoid litigation.7 3  In most instances, however,
parties have already extensively negotiated informally before
consultations are requested. 7 4 In fact, the negotiations to modify
the 1992 U.S.-E.C. Aircraft Agreement precipitated the
consultation request.'75 The majority of disputes do not move past
the consultation stage; they are either settled or the complainant
does not continue for other reasons. 1
76
If these "consultations" fail, then a "panel" is established to
resolve the dispute. 177 In the instant aviation dispute, additional
consultations were requested by the European Union after a panel
was requested. 178  The European Union wanted to clarify
statements made by the United States at the DSB meeting
following the request for a panel. 179 The additional consultations
caused a delay but a panel was eventually formed.
In contrast to the GATT era, a WTO member's request for the
establishment of a panel is virtually assured to be honored. 8 °
Also, the SCM Agreement expedites the normal process and does
not allow a member's objection to delay the formation of a
panel.' 8' Since there is no permanent panel, the DSB creates a
171 See Ameet Sachdev, U.S., EU Ease Plane Stances; Sides Willing to Talk on
Government Aid, CHI. TRIB. Oct. 11, 2005, §3 at 3.
172 See David Palmeter, National Sovereignty and the World Trade Organization, 2
J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 77, 80 (2000), reprinted in DAVID PALMETER, WTO AS A LEGAL
SYsTEM: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND Policy 259, 262 (2003).
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
176 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 43-44.
177 See DSU, supra note 155, art. 4-6.
178 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States-
Measures Affecting the Trade in Large Civil Aircraft Addendum, VT/DS317/1/Add.1
(July 1, 2005).
179 Id.
180 See WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 49; DSU, supra note 155, art. 6.
181 See SCM Agreement, supra note 8, T 4.4; WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156,
at 61.
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new three-person 8 2 panel for every dispute.'83 The DSU details
qualifications for the panelists, including experience'84 and
independence from the dispute.'85
During the selection process the WTO Secretariat proposes
nominations for the panel to the parties.'86 Parties may reject a
panelist nominee. A party, however, cannot indefinitely stall the
proceedings by perpetually rejecting nominees, If the parties
cannot agree on panelists within twenty days after the
establishment of a panel, either party may request intervention.187
The Director-General, in consultation with the chairpersons of the
DSB and the relevant committee or council, will choose the
panelists. 88
The time frame for panel selection is compressed when dealing
with subsidies. Under the SCM Agreement, the composition of
the panel should be finalized fifteen days after the panel is
established. 189 For prohibited subsidies, the panelists should
immediately be selected.' 90
The aviation feud has not followed these fast paced timetables.
As some journalists predicted, delays were incurred as the United
States and European Union could not agree on panelists.'91 In an
interesting twist, Director-General Pascal Lamy recused himself
from appointing panelists because of his former position as
European Union trade commissioner. 192 Instead, one of Lamy's
182 "Panels shall be composed of three panelists unless the parties to the dispute
agree, within 10 days from the establishment of the panel, to a panel composed of five
panelists. Members shall be informed promptly of the composition of the panel." DSU,
supra note 155, art. 8.5.
183 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 50.
184 See DSU, supra note 155, art. 8.1.
185 See id. art. 8.2.
186 Id. art. 8.6.
187 See DSU, supra note 155, art. 8.7.
188 See id.
189 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, 7.4.
190 Id., 4.4.
191 See Flying Test, FIN. TIMES (London- Asia Ed. 1), Aug. 9, 2005, Observer, at 10.
192 See, e.g., Alan Beattie, Lamy Waives right to Name WTO Panel, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 8, 2005, § World News, at 9.
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deputies made the selections.'93
The panel functions as the first stage in litigation. As the
WTO Secretariat explains: "Panels are the quasi-judicial bodies, in
a way tribunals, in charge of adjudicating disputes between
members in the first instance."' 194 The panel's most important role
is to submit a report to the WTO members.' 95 A panel report
issued to the members of the WTO will not become binding until
it is adopted by the DSB.' 96
Recently, to increase confidence and transparency in the
system, disputing members have agreed to open up hearings to the
public.' 97 In the instant dispute, both parties have agreed to open
the proceedings to the public and so the public will access the
hearings for what is only the second time in WTO dispute
resolution history.' 98
C. Appeals
Panel decisions may be appealed to the Appellate Body.' 99
The Appellate Body, unlike the panels, is made up of permanent
members.2"' The seven members are appointed by a consensus of
the DSB for four year terms and can be reappointed once.2' The
members are not affiliated with any government, however their
backgrounds represent the diverse membership of the WTO. °2
The current members of the Body are nationals of Egypt, Brazil,
India, the United States, South Africa, Italy, and Japan.20 3
Issues before the Appellate Body "shall be limited to issues of
law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed
193 Id.
194 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 21.
195 See id.
196 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 61.
197 See Aimee Turner, Doors to WTO Trade Dispute Hearings to be Thrown Open,
FLIGHT INT'L, Jan. 24, 2006, at 5.
198 Id.
199 See DSU, supra note 155, art. 17.
200 Id., art. 17.1.
201 Id., art. 17.2.
202 See id.
203 WTO Dispute Settlement-Appellate Body Members, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dispue/ab-members-descrpe.htm.
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by the panel. 2 °4 Consequently, questions of fact are laid to rest in
the panel stage.
If the appeal fails and the member still refuses to comply with
the penalty, then the injured member may be authorized to enact
countervailing measures (self-help).2"5
D. Implementation
The DSU stresses the importance of implementation: "Prompt
compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is
essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the
benefit of all Members. 2 °6
In the event of a successful violation complaint the
implementation phase follows. After adoption of a panel or
Appellate Body report, a meeting will be held within thirty days.
20 7
The concerned member will announce its intentions with respect
to implementation of the DSB recommendations and rulings.0 8
Also, this meeting is usually used to address the time-period for
implementation.209
The concerned member is required to immediately comply
with recommendations and rulings, unless it is impractical to do
so. 210 If a member cannot comply immediately, they are given a
"reasonable period of time.",21' This reasonable period of time
cannot delay the implementation past fifteen months starting from
the establishment of the panel stage.212 This time cap can be
extended by the DSB to eighteen months, or longer if the parties
agree that there are exceptional circumstances.213 Notably, the
SCM Agreement does not observe a reasonable period of time for
204 DSU, supra note 155, art. 17.6.
205 See id., art. 22.
206 DSU, supra note 155, art. 21.1.
207 Id., art. 21.3.
208 Id.
209 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 76.
210 DSU, supra note 155, art. 21.3.
211 Id.
212 Id., art. 21.4.
213 Id.
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prohibited subsidization.21 4 Rather, at the panel stage the panelists
must recommend immediate withdrawal and a specific time frame
for this to happen.21 5
The DSB will continue to monitor the implementation of the
recommendations and rulings.21 6 Further, any member may raise
the issue of implementation at any time.217 The specific issue and
its implementation will be included on the DSB meeting agenda
until the subsidy is resolved.218  As long as the subsidy issue
lingers, -it remains under surveillance even if measures have been
taken for non-compliance.219
E. Non-compliance
In the event that a losing member is required to take action and
simply does nothing, non-compliance is easy to identify. The
issue of identifying non-compliance becomes cloudier when the
losing member passes a new law or regulation with the belief that
it satisfies the recommendations and ruling.22° When members
disagree as to whether there is compliance or not, the matter is
referred to a panel by the DSB.221 Whenever possible, this panel is
made up of the persons on the original panel.222 A report from the
panel will be produced within ninety days of the referral of the
matter.22' Although the DSU does not explicitly state that the
compliance panel report can be appealed, it is allowed and
frequently done.224
If the "reasonable period of time" expires, and the losing
214 See SCM Agreement, supra note 8, 1 4.7.
215 Id.
216 DSU, supra note 155, art. 21.
217 Id. art. 21.6.
218 The issue is mandated to appear on the agenda six months after the establishment
of a reasonable period of time for implementation. At least ten days before each meeting
the concerned members must submit a written report of its progress. See id.
219 See DSU, supra note 155, art. 22.8.
220 See WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 79.
221 See DSU, supra note 155, art. 21.5.
222 See id.
223 In the event that the panel cannot produce the report within ninety days, the
panel will explain this to the DSB in writing. See id.
224 See WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 79.
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member has not conformed to the recommendations and rulings,
temporary measures are available to the prevailing member.2 5
These measures provide negotiations where the non-implementing
member and prevailing member will attempt to agree upon
compensation.2 6 This compensation is not a cash pay-off; rather,
it is a benefit such as a tariff reduction offered to the prevailing
member. 7 Partly because compensation is voluntary,228 mutually
agreed-upon compensation solutions rarely are made. 9
If, within twenty days after the "reasonable period of time" has
passed, no compensation solution is reached, the most serious
consequence may occur. 23 ° The prevailing member "may request
authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the
Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the
covered agreements., 231  These sanctions are referred to by the
SCM Agreement as "countervailing measures. '232
Prohibited subsidies, under the SCM Agreement, bypass the
twenty day compensation negotiations and proceed with
countervailing measures immediately. 233 In the event of actionable
subsidies, the prevailing member may request countermeasures for
non-compliance six months after the DSB adopts either the
Appellate Body or panel report.234
The rules for retaliation are complex and detailed. Generally,
the countermeasures taken must be in proportion to the harm
caused to the prevailing member. 235  For example, if a subsidy
causes four billion euros worth of harm to another member's civil
aircraft industry, then a hundred billion euro tariff surcharge
225 See DSU, supra note 155, arts. 3.7 & 22.1.
226 See DSU, supra note 155, art. 22.2.
227 See WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 80.
228 See DSU, supra note 155, art. 22.1.
229 See WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 80.
230 See DSU, supra note 155, art. 22.2.
231 Id., art. 22.2.
232 See SCM Agreement, supra note 8.
233 Unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request for countervailing
measures, which would require the prevailing party to sit by and do nothing, the request
is virtually guaranteed. See SCM Agreement, supra note 8, T 4.10.
234 Id., 17.9.
235 DSU, supra note 155, art. 22.3.
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would be an inappropriate countermeasure. In addition, the
sanctions must correspond to the sector harmed.236 For example,
countermeasures for a patent violation should relate to patents.237
If the parties cannot agree on the complaintent's request for
retaliation, then arbitration can be requested. 238 The arbitrators
23 9
should be the original panelists, if available; if they are not
available the WTO Director-General shall make a selection.24 °
During this type of arbitration, sanctions are halted and the
arbitrators determines whether the prevailing member's proposed
countermeasures are proportional to the trade harm inflicted. 4'
F. Dispute Resolution in Practice
Compared to GATT, the WTO has proven to be successful.
There are, however, several cases that expose the weaknesses in
the current DSU system. The Banana Wars and the foreign sales
corporation scheme are presented to illustrate the complexity of
resolving a dispute when opposing members tenaciously resist.
Also, the Canada-Brazil aviation feud is discussed as a parallel
case to the current dispute, which may serve as the clearest
window into the future.
In European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas (EC-Bananas), the DSU failed.2 42
The complainants alleged that former European colonies were
shown favorable treatment through tariff preferences, specifically
with regard to banana imports.243 The dispute proceeded through
consultations, 2" the panel stage, 245 appellate review, 246 arbitration
236 Id., art. 22.3(d)(i).
237 See WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 82.
238 DSU, supra note 155, art. 22.6.
239 The "arbiter" in the DSU refers to either individuals or a group. DSU, supra
note 155, n.15.
240 Id., art. 22.6.
241 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 84.
242 Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, European Communities-Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/58 (July 2, 2001).
243 See Panel Report, European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale, and
Distribution of Bananas, IV, 9, WT/DS27/R/ECU (May 22, 1997).
244 Request for Consultations by Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United
States, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
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concerning implementation,247 and appeal of the arbiter's report248
before a mutually agreed upon solution was reached. 249  But the
mutually agreed-upon solution did not resolve the dispute. These
so-called "Banana Wars" began in the early 1990s, before the
WTO was formed, and continue to this day.250 Along the way, the
United States began countervailing measures five months before
the WTO actually gave authorization. 1
As the European Union resisted the DSU system, the WTO
ruled on a different U.S.-E.C. dispute, which impacted the Banana
War. In United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations" (U.S.-FSC), the European Union prevailed in a
complaint against the United States.252 This ruling provided the
European Union with leverage. 253  The result was a bilateral
agreement; a settlement which included a new EU tariff system
due by 2006.254 The agreement has not signaled an end to the
Bananas, WT/DS 16/1 (Oct. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Request for Consultations EC-
Bananas].
245 Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/ECU, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND,
WT/DS27/RIMEX, WT/DS27/RIUSA (May 22, 1997).
246 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
247 Arbitration of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes Award of the Arbitrator Said EI-Naggar, European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/15 (Jan. 7, 1998).
248 Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Apr. 9, 1999).
249 See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, supra note 242.
250 See Raj Bhala, The Banana War, 31 McGEORGE L. REv. 839, 848-50 (2000).
251 See id. at 941-43.
252 Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities,
United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS I 08/RW2
(Sept. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Second Recourse EC-FSC].
253 Hunter R. Clark, Amy Bogran & Hayley Hanson, The WTO Ruling on Foreign
Sales Corporations: Costliest Battle Yet in an Escalating Trade War Between the United
States and the European Union?, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 291, 315-16 (2001).
254 Amelia Porges, Settling WTO Disputes: What do Litigation Models Tell Us?, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 141, 164 n.85 (2003). The tariff promise threatened the next
GATT/WTO Round. Certain countries refused to launch the Doha Rounds until they
received waivers from the yet to be created new tariff system. Id.
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Banana War. As of the writing of this comment, the WTO is still
metaphorically slipping on bananas. EU proposals for a new tariff
system have been rejected twice. 5  Considering that Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico and the United States256  initiated the
consultation stage in September of 1996, the Banana Wars have
haunted the WTO for most of its history.257
Not only did U.S.-FSC send ripples through the Banana War,
it is also an example of the DSU system's lack of results. Like
EC-Bananas, U.S.-FSC ran the gamut of the DSU stages.258
The dispute began brewing in the 1970s when the United States
implemented a tax scheme to remedy its losses in the world export
battle.259
The United States created the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC)
tax scheme as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984.260 U.S.
parent corporations were given tax breaks on foreign trade income
(dividends) earned from international subsidiaries acting as the
exporters.26' This scheme was rejected by the DSB as a violation
of several international agreements including the SCM
Agreement.262
Following its loss on appeal in 2000,263 the United States
repealed the FSC tax scheme, but replaced it with the ETI Act,
which also failed to receive DSB approval.264 In 2003, the
255 WTO-Dispute Settlement-the disputes-DS27, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop..e/dispue/cases-e/ds27_e.htm (summarizing the conflict to date) (last updated
Oct. 9, 2006).
256 Ecuador joined in after it became a member of the WTO. See Request for
Consultations by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the United States,
European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/1 (Feb. 5, 1996).
257 Request for Consultations EC-Bananas, supra note 244.
258 See Second Recourse EC-FSC, supra note 252, T 1.1.
259 James Joseph Shallue, An Analysis of Foreign Sales Corporations and the
European Communities' Four Billion-Dollar Retaliation, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
179, 180 (2002).
260 Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984). The parts relating to FSCs were
codified in I.R.C. §§ 921-927 (1984).
261 See Second Recourse EC-FSC, supra note 252, IN 2.4, 2.5.
262 See Shallue, supra note 259, at 181.
263 See id. at 204-05.
264 See id.
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European Union was authorized to impose four billion dollars in
sanctions.265 The European Union, however, stated that it would
not implement countermeasures so long as the U.S. Congress was
trying to comply.2 66 The United States jettisoned the ETI Act but
replaced it with a parachute: the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004.267 In the fall of 2005 the DSB compliance panel rejected the
Jobs Act.268 Both the ETI and Jobs Act clung to the FSC tax
scheme through "grandfather" and "transitional" clauses. 269 The
United States appealed the compliance panel decision and lost.270
Both EC-Bananas and U.S.-FSC are examples of the DSU
producing no results. Despite the threat of using authorized
sanctions and even the diligent use of countervailing measures,
WTO members can still thwart compliance. Alternatively, when
adversaries are both guilty they may choose to allow no result.
This was the case in the Canada-Brazil aircraft dispute.
Canada and Brazil provide the only previous large civil aircraft
dispute brought before the DSB. Like the instant dispute, the
members both alleged that the other was subsidizing their
respective aviation industries in violation of the SCM Agreement.
In Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil-
Aircraft), Canada claimed Brazil's Programa de Financiamento as
Exportaq&es (PROEX) violated the SCM Agreement.2 7' The
Brazilian subsidy program supported its national aviation
champion, Empressa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (Embraer).272
PROEX reduced the cost of aircraft purchases for buyers. 73 The
265 Recourse by the European Communities to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement
and Article 22.7 of the DSU, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations," WT/DS 108/26 (Apr. 25, 2003).
266 Id. at 213.
267 See Second Recourse EC-FSC, supra note 252, 1 2.14.
268 Id.,I 8.1.
269 See id., 2.12, 2.17.
270 Appellate Body Report and Panel Report pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU,
United States Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, WT/DS108/36 (Mar. 17,
2006).
271 Request for Consultation by Canada, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft, WT/DS46/1 (June 21, 1996).
272 See Ivan Krmpotic, Brazil-Aircraft: Qualitative and Temporal Aspects of
"Withdrawal" Under SCM Article 4.7,33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 653, 659 (2002).
273 Id. (quoting in part Panel Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for
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government agreed to subsidize part of the loans buyers took out
to pay for Embraer planes.274 Brazil would pay 3.8 percentage
points of the interest rate to the bank via national treasury bonds;
the buyer was responsible for the rest of the loan.2 75 The DSB
found that this practice was a prohibited subsidy under the SCM
Agreement and recommended withdrawal. 76
Compliance with the DSB report became an issue because
"withdrawal" of the PROEX subsidy was unclear. Brazil claimed
that it could continue to issue the treasury bonds for the buyer
agreements that were made before the DSB ruling.277 Eventually,
the compliance panel and the Appellate Body ruled against
Brazil.278 Subsequently, in late 2000, Canada was authorized to
impose countervailing measures to the tune of C$344.2 million
(US $233.5 million) a year.279  These sanctions have not been
imposed because of Brazil's subsequent successful WTO litigation
against Canada; this litigation can be analogized to a counterclaim.
In Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, Brazil accused Canada of subsidizing its national aviation
champion, Bombardier, Inc. (Bombardier).2 0  The panel found
prohibited subsidization under the SCM Agreement.28  After an
unsuccessful appeal, Canada implemented the DSB's
recommendations. 82  Brazil challenged the sufficiency of
Canada's compliance, but lost in July of 2000.283 This, however,
Aircraft, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999)).
274 See id.
275 Id.
276 Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft
Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, 82(b), WT/DS46/AB/RW (July 21,
2000).
277 See Krmpotic, supra note 272, at 665-67.
278 See id. at 668.
279 See Panel Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft Second
Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU , 1.6, WT/DS46/RW/2 (July 26, 2001).
280 Canada-Aircraft, supra note 102, 2.
281 Panel Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft,
10.1, WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999).
282 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft Recourse by Brazil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, 4, WT/DS70/AB/RW (July 21,
2000).
283 WTO-Dispute Settlement-the disputes-DS70, http://www.wto.org/english/
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was not the end to Brazil's fight.
Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional
Aircraft would supply Brazil with a counterweight for the
sanctions from Brazil-Aircraft. In January of 2001, consultations
with Canada were requested. 284 The allegations included (among
other things) claims that loan guarantees violated the SCM
Agreement. 285  In the panel stage, Brazil prevailed; Canadian
account financing to Air Wisconsin, Air Nostrum, and Comair
were prohibited subsidies.286 In May of 2002, Brazil sought
permission to use countervailing measures.287  They claimed
Canada had failed to implement the DSB's recommendations and
rulings within the mandatory ninety-day period.288  Brazil was
successful again; the arbiter authorized sanctions up to US
$247,797,000.289 As of the writing of this comment, these
sanctions have not been implemented.
The Canada-Brazil aviation dispute exposed definitive
violations of the SCM Agreement, but yielded no results because
neither member was interested in sparking a trade war.
Consequently, they continued to subsidize their respective
industries and did not use the countervailing measures granted by
the DSB.290  Similarly, the U.S.-E.C. aviation dispute involves
possible subsidy activities on both sides. In light of the Canada-
Brazil dispute and the nature of the large civil aircraft industry, it
is clear that the DSU will not likely be able to enforce the SCM
tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds70_e.htm (summarizing the dispute to date) (last updated
Oct. 9, 2006).
284 Request for Consultations by Brazil, Canada-Export Credits and Loan
Guaranteesfor Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/1 (Jan. 25, 2001).
285 See id.
286 Panel Report, Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional
Aircraft, 8.1, WT/DS222/R (Jan. 28, 2002).
287 See Recourse to Arbitration by Canada under Article 22.6 of the DSU and
Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for
Regional Aircraft, 1.2, WT/DS222/ARB (Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Recourse to
Arbitration Canada-Aircraft Credits and Loans].
288 See id.,[ 1.1.
289 Recourse to Arbitration Canada-Aircraft Credits and Loans, supra note 287,
4.1.
290 See Edward Alden & Raphael Minder, War ofAircraft Titans gives WTO Biggest
Case, FIN. TIMES (London), June 1, 2005, § International Economy, at 8.
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Agreement in the instant dispute.
VI. Criticisms of the SCM Agreement and DSU
A. Problems with the SCM Agreement
At the heart of the aircraft dispute is the SCM Agreement. The
drafters specifically had large civil aircraft in mind. A footnote
under non-actionable subsidies singles out the commercial
aviation industry to exclude it from an exception provision.2 9'
This comment argues that the agreement, as applied to large civil
aircraft, is not practical. The SCM agreement cannot be
practically applied to the Airbus-Boeing dispute because the
agreement presupposes that subsidies are inherently bad for trade.
The civil aircraft industry is simply a different creature. Notably,
this paper does not argue against the general application of the
SCM Agreement. In fact, the agreement, when applied to most
products, allows for innovation and competition. The enormous
cost involved with manufacturing large planes alters the paradigm
for viewing subsidies. Prohibiting subsidization of the large civil
aircraft industry (i) stifles innovation, (ii) discourages competition,
and (iii) is unrealistic.
B. Stifling Innovation
The sky high cost of designing new aircraft makes
modernization an expensive process. While this comment asserts
that both Airbus and Boeing receive subsidies, the benefits on the
EU side are greater than those on the U.S. side. The financial
support behind Airbus has allowed it to be considerably more
innovative. For instance, over a ten year period, launch aid has
allowed Airbus to develop five new planes, while Boeing has only
been able to afford one.292 As a former Boeing chief executive
complained, Airbus could afford to gamble with new designs
because the risk was on the taxpayers.293 A curator for the
National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution,
explained that "[a]erospace manufacturers literally bet the
291 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
292 Nose to Nose-Boeing v. Airbus, ECONOMIST (Special Report 2) (U.S. Ed.), June
25, 2005, at 69 (paraphrasing Harry Stonecipher, former Boeing chief executive).
293 Id.
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company on a new design because of the enormous cost associated
with developing an aircraft .... Given the slim margin for
error, a state-supported parachute is necessary when inventive
risks fail, or else innovation is stifled.295 The SCM agreement is
not practical as applied to the aircraft technology because it
prohibits the funding that is necessary for greater innovation.
C. Discouraging Competition
The civil aircraft industry flies in the face of traditional lassiez
faire economic thought. Generally, subsidies are thought to harm
competition. Yet, with the commercial aviation industry,
subsidies are necessary for competition.2 96
For the purpose of this comment, competition is assumed to be
positive. The introduction of Airbus to the market should curb a
recurrence of monopoly pricing that occurred with Boeing 747s
during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. 297  Competition encourages
competitive pricing, efficiency, and innovation. The SCM
Agreement, however, keeps competitors out of the large civil
aircraft market. The incredible financial burden in the industry
requires government subsidies for a successful start-up period.298
294 Launius, supra note 31, at 64.
295 There is a one time bailout exception in the SCM Agreement. See supra note
135 and accompanying text. This, however, is not the type of continued support an
aircraft manufacturer requires to be innovative.
296 See generally U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE
U.S. LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT AEROSTRUCTURES INDUSTRY, USITC Pub. No. 3433 (June
2001) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial
Regulation), available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/332/pub3433.pdf (accessing
the large civil aircraft industry's costs and different governments' involvment).
297 See WILL HuTroN, A DECLARATION OF INTERDEPENDENCE: WHY AMERICA
SHOULD JOIN THE WORLD 232 (2004).
298 One author described the task of starting Airbus:
To design, build, and develop a fleet of state-of-the-art civil aircraft was always
going to be a long-term task. It would require shareholders prepared to defer
their returns for perhaps decades. It would require, as the American aerospace
industry had received through defense contracts and tax rebates from export
rates, billions of dollars of grants to support the public interest in possessing an
aircraft manufacturer that the markets could not create spontaneously
themselves. The time horizons for the returns on equity investment and private
bank debt are extraordinarily short-term compared to the time needed to
develop an aircraft business.
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Introducing competitors into the large civil aircraft market is
extremely difficult. It takes ten to twelve billion dollars just to get
a new plane designed and ready for production. 299 This sum does
not even include the start-up costs for a manufacturing site. A
manufacturer will recoup their investment in a new plane after
selling 500-600 planes, or about ten years. The risks involved
with starting up a commercial aircraft manufacturer are hard to
stomach as a private investor. Governments and a limited number
of large multinational corporations are the only entities capable of
supporting such ventures. Further, to gain market share, prices
must be cut; Airbus, for instance, was prepared to go through
several unprofitable models before turning a profit.3°°
Considering the sacrifices necessary to gain part of the market
share and the costly price tag to even compete in the market, it is
not surprising that a government (or three or four) must be a
forgiving creditor. Further, calculation of the interest rate must
take into account the long period before the corporation becomes
profitable. Jean Pierson, President of Airbus in 1987, explained in
an interview: "[U.S. critics] were right to say that without money
from the government at the time, when we were at zero we could
never have beaten Boeing. What bank would have been stupid
enough to have lent us money ...31 Government loans that are
used to start up an aviation giant are different than other loans;
governments and other lenders cannot demand market level
interest rates and repayment needs to be flexible. The SCM
Agreement would characterize the tactics to start up Airbus as
prohibited subsidization.3 °2  Essentially, the agreement, if
followed, bars competitors from having a chance to enter the
market.
D. Unrealistic
The world depends on commercial airplanes; it is unrealistic to
expect the industry to not be subsidized. An estimated nine billion
Id. at 230.
299 Id.
300 See ARIS, supra note 16, at 160.
301 Id.
302 See discussion supra Part III.C.
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global passengers board commercial airplanes each year.30 3
Despite the world's reliance on aviation, some calculations
indicate that less than ten percent of commercial jets developed
since 1982 have been profitable.304 As aerospace technology
evolves it becomes more difficult for individual companies to bear
the costs.3 °5 A world without aircraft subsidies would result in the
stagnation of innovation, at best. At worst, the price of flying
would skyrocket and suffocate consumers.
Subsidies have built the commercial aviation industry. From
European government support of aviation in the early twentieth
century, to Cold War military contracts benefiting U.S. firms, to
the Airbus consortium, the industry has greatly benefited from
government aid. Antagonists may assert that aircraft subsidies
create unfair competition. The irony is that every single aviation
titan has been hoisted up by subsidies. Whether it is a corporation
in Brazil, Canada, the United States, or the European Union, large
civil aircraft manufacturers cannot exist without subsidies. The
SCM Agreement, as applied to large civil aircraft, threatens the
global industry.
E. Problems with the DSU
The DSU, relative to GATT and other previous trade
agreements, is a significant innovation. Overall, many writers
have had positive evaluations.30 6 Regardless, the system is still
flawed. This comment asserts that the enforcement and
compliance problems are aggravated when dealing with
commercial aviation subsidies.
The DSU has already been widely criticized. The extent of
this critique will be limited to the major flaw that is salient to the
aviation dispute. The DSB has a difficult time enforcing its
303 See John Linder, Prevent Terror Threats, THE WASH. TIMES, May 30, 2005, at
A23.
304 Levick, supra note 64, at 460-61.
305 See Launius, supra note 3 1, at 64.
306 As one commentator wrote, "the WTO dispute settlement system is a place
where the United States and the European Communities can resolve their trade disputes
though third-party adjudication and still conduct their trade relations effectively and
responsibly, without the need for any special procedures." William J. Davey, The WTO
Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 34 (2005).
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recommendations and rulings when the stakes are high. In
situations like the instant case, the DSU cannot produce an
effective solution through litigation. There is a self-defeating loop
created when both parties have committed similar violations. In
this situation, compliance under the DSU is supposed to be
compelled by a party who is also guilty of the same violation.
This comment has asserted that all large civil aircraft producers
have benefited from subsidization. Alleged subsidy violations, in
regard to the civil aviation industry, will inevitably be defeated
when both sides succeed with their claims. The SCM Agreement
cannot be enforced under the DSU when applied to large civil
aircraft.
As EC-Bananas, U.S.-FSC, and the Canada-Brazil aviation
disputes have demonstrated, the DSU lacks a reliable compliance
mechanism. While the DSU is an improvement over GATT, it has
the same inherent problem of any international agreement-lack
of enforcement.
The remedy for non-compliance under the DSU is self-help.
This is problematic because it relies on the individual complainant
to serve as an enforcer when a losing member resists a ruling. In
disputes like the Canada-Brazil aircraft case where both sides are
expected to be an enforcer, the agreement being subjected to
litigation will not be upheld. It is in the best interest of both sides
to refrain from engaging in a trade war. The result is non-
compliance.
Consequently, the SCM Agreement is less likely to be
enforced. The presence of a government subsidy is evidence that
the State has an interest in that industry. When a member is
devoted to maintaining non-compliant behavior, the DSU is
unlikely to be effective. In instances like U.S.-FSC, the
offending party can thwart compliance. Strong trade activity
between members, like the United States and the European Union,
discourage the use of authorized retaliation. This allows foot
dragging and leads to no result from litigation.
VI. Forecasting the Future of the Skies
A. The possible avenues for the dispute
As of the writing of this comment, consultations have given
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way to the panel stage.3"7 The avenues for the dispute are limited
to either full litigation or a withdrawal of the claims.
WTO members prefer to negotiate and settle rather than
litigate. At this point in the aviation dispute, an outside settlement
would involve a withdrawal of the claims. In one academic's
analysis of 181 disputes, the cases settled 35% of the time.30 8
Additionally, the matter was dropped 21% of the time due to
commercial changes or the halting of a challenged matter. 309  It
appears as though the panel stage is reached only about half of the
time after consultations are requested. 310 These statistics support
the idea that settlement is preferred over litigation.
Public statements by the parties seem to indicate that a
settlement is likely. Trade representatives for both sides have
expressed their distaste for litigation and a preference for
negotiation. 31 1  The respective representatives for Boeing and
Airbus have also voiced their hopes for a successful end with a
settlement.312 Some believe, however, these public statements are
just "posturing., 313
Even the DSU system encourages talking between the parties.
The availability of DSB assistance through "good offices,
conciliation and mediation" 314 is available at any time and assists
in achieving a settlement.
Despite the signs pointing towards a settlement, full litigation
seems inevitable. Barring major outside events rattling the
aviation dispute, the panel and Appellate Body will likely get a
chance to issue reports. The circumstances of the aviation feud
have made it ripe for litigation.
First, the reason for requesting consultations and the panel in
307 WrO-Dispute Settlement-the disputes-DS317, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds317_e.htm (last updated Oct. 9, 2006).
308 Id. at 48.
309 Id.
310 See id.; Mark Clough, The WTO Dispute Settlement System-A Practitioner
Perspective, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 252, 264 (2000).
311 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
312 See Ameet Sachdev, Boeing Finance Chief Predicts Settlement on Subsidies,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 2005, §3, at 1.
313 Id.
314 See DSU, supra note 155, art. 5; WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 156, at 94.
[Vol. XXXfl
WTO-SUBSIDIES AND LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT
the first place was precisely because bilateral negotiations
failed.3"5 One may argue that litigation is part of a negotiation
strategy, but if both parties really prefer to settle, a question
remains: Why has neither side requested good offices, conciliation
and mediation?
Second, a settlement would require concessions from both
sides. This is why the dispute escalated to the DSB. On one hand,
the United States has watched its civil aircraft dominance quickly
evaporate. If the United States feels like it is reeling back on its
heels it may be reluctant to allow any further government support
for Airbus. On the other hand, Airbus is much more than just
another corporation; for Europe it is a source of pride. It may be
difficult to take Airbus off the former consortium's shoulders.
If the panel and appellate stages are not cut off by a settlement,
then are three potential outcomes: (1) neither side winning, (2) one
side prevailing, or (3) a two-sided victory.
Neither side prevailing is the least likely scenario. A reading
of the respective evidence cited in the complaints in conjunction
with the SCM Agreement suggests that both sides may be
responsible for prohibited and actionable subsidization.
16
Only one party prevailing is also unlikely, given the evidence
both sides have cited in their requests for consultations. If,
however, there was a one-sided victory it would likely be in favor
of the United States. This is because alleged EU subsidies are
much more direct and easier to categorize as prohibited subsidies.
Questionable loans to Airbus are characterized by the European
Communities as "repayable loans," whereas the United States
alleges this "launch aid" is either not paid back or set with interest
below the market. 317 This does not take away from the lengthy list
of tax breaks and research and design support that Boeing
receives.318 The United States may claim that the tax breaks are
consistent with the benefits all other similar domestic industries
315 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
316 See Consultation Request EC-Aircraft, supra note 2; Consultation Request
U.S.-Aircraft, supra note 2; SCM Agreement, supra note 8.
317 Editorial and Comment, Unfair Skies: EU Subsidies to Airbus put U.S.
Competitor at Significant Disadvantage, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Sept. 28, 2005, at
12A.
318 See Consultation Request U.S.-Aircraft, supra note 2.
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enjoy. The US could argue that the taxes are not "otherwise due"
and not a subsidy under the SCM Agreement. The U.S. subsidies
appear to be much more like actionable, rather than prohibited,
subsidies, which is a more flexible position to defend.319
Regardless, the United States could run into trouble proving that
government contracts with Boeing are not subsidies.
In the unlikely event that only one side emerges victorious, the
dispute will likely drag on for decades. The instant dispute is a
good candidate for full litigation with no result. The compliance
problems featured in EC-Bananas3 20 and U.S.-FSC 21 could be
employed by either side. The charade of compliance and foot
dragging in U.S.-FSC would inevitably be used by a losing
member. As EC-Bananas demonstrated, even half a decade of
countervailing measures may not be enough to compel a loser to
comply. Further, both sides are smart enough to realize that
unleashing sanctions of this size could lead to a trade war with the
entire global market as the loser. A one-sided victory would be
most peculiar given the respective support the United States and
European Union provide to Boeing and Airbus.
The most reasonable outcome would be a two-sided victory
mirroring the Canadian-Brazilian aircraft dispute. This is not to
suggest that any time two members file parallel complaints a dual
victory will result. Rather, the U.S.-EU complaints appear to be
equally compelling.
If both the United States and the European Union prevail, the
outcome would be no result despite full litigation. Looking back
at the Canada-Brazil aircraft dispute, after Canada and Brazil were
awarded massive countervailing measures, both sides realized
using them would be a lose-lose proposition. To date, the
sanctions have not been imposed and the members simply
continue to violate the SCM Agreement.322 In the event of a dual
victory, neither party has the incentive to comply with the DSB's
recommendations and rulings. An overly dramatic analogy would
be a comparison to the cold war theory of mutually assured
319 See supra Part III.D.
320 See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
321 See supra notes 252-61 and accompanying text.
322 Edward Alden & Raphael Minder, War of Aircraft Titans gives WTO Biggest
Case, FIN. TIMES (London), June 1, 2005, at 8.
[Vol. XXXII
WTO-SUBSIDIES AND LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT
destruction. 323 In the event of non-compliance, arming the United
States and European Union with multi-billion Euro countervailing
measures is like handing over thermonuclear weapons. Partly out
of fear of retaliation and the harm it would do to the world market,
neither side would like to see a trade war. If this feud makes it
through full litigation, it will likely have been a waste of time.
VII.Conclusion
So, what does this mean for the future of large civil aircraft
and international trade? In the event of a settlement, or
compliance after litigation, it would be a major mark of success
for the WTO. Considering the instant dispute is thought to be the
biggest case brought to the DSB, a successful resolution would
add to the creditability of the DSU and the WTO overall.
Most likely, however, this dispute will serve as another
footnote pointing to the shortcomings of the DSU. The
circumstances have created a scenario that makes enforcement of
the SCM Agreement unlikely. Both sides are likely to be found
guilty of subsidization and neither side has a great incentive to
give up its practices. The self-help trade sanctions made avaliable
as an enforcement mechanism have dubious utility in this dispute.
Despite the amount of attention the dispute has received,
government support of the large civil aircraft industry will be
maintained. If any changes are implemented, the aviation
subsidies on both sides of the Atlantic will simply masquerade in
different garbs. Any compliance will surely be token and
subsidies will appear in different forms.
Finally, the SCM Agreement, as applied to large civil aircraft,
is not pragmatic. Proponents of the agreement ignore the unique
demands of the large civil aircraft industry. Halting subsidies to
aviation manufacturers stifles innovation, handcuffs competition,
and is unrealistic.
RYAN E. LEE
323 This is aptly abbreviated as MAD.
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